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Abstract Although deep neural networks havemade tremen-
dous progress in the area of multimedia representation, train-
ing neural models requires a large amount of data and time.
It is well-known that utilizing trainedmodels as initial weights
often achieves lower training error than neural networks that
are not pre-trained. A fine-tuning step helps to reduce both
the computational cost and improve performance. There-
fore, sharing trained models has been very important for
the rapid progress of research and development. In addition,
trained models could be important assets for the owner(s)
who trained them, hence we regard trained models as in-
tellectual property. In this paper, we propose a digital wa-
termarking technology for ownership authorization of deep
neural networks. First, we formulate a new problem: em-
bedding watermarks into deep neural networks. We also de-
fine requirements, embedding situations, and attack types
on watermarking in deep neural networks. Second, we pro-
pose a general framework for embedding a watermark in
model parameters, using a parameter regularizer. Our ap-
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proach does not impair the performance of networks into
which a watermark is placed because the watermark is em-
bedded while training the host network. Finally, we perform
comprehensive experiments to reveal the potential of water-
marking deep neural networks as the basis of this new re-
search effort. We show that our framework can embed a wa-
termark during the training of a deep neural network from
scratch, and during fine-tuning and distilling, without im-
pairing its performance. The embedded watermark does not
disappear even after fine-tuning or parameter pruning; the
watermark remains complete even after 65% of parameters
are pruned.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks havemade tremendous progress in the
area of multimedia representation [4, 40, 49, 50]. It attempts
to model high-level abstractions in data by employing deep
architectures composed of multiple non-linear transforma-
tions [6]. In addition, deep neural networks can be applied to
various types of data such as sound [49], video [29], text [46],
time series [53], and images [32]. In particular, deep convo-
lutional neural networks (DCNN) such as LeNet [35],
AlexNet [32], VGGNet [42], GoogLeNet [44], and ResNet [22]
have demonstrated remarkable performance for a wide range
of computer vision problems and other applications.
Additionally, many deep learning frameworks have been
released. They help engineers and researchers to develop
systems based on deep learning or do research with less ef-
fort. Examples of these great deep learning frameworks are
Caffe [26], Theano [7], Torch [11], Chainer [45], Tensor-
Flow [37], and Keras [9].
Although these frameworks have made it easy to utilize
deep neural networks in real applications, training is still a
difficult task because it requires a large amount of data and
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time; for example, several weeks are needed to train a very
deep ResNet with the latest GPUs on the ImageNet dataset
for instance [22].
Therefore, trained models are sometimes provided on
web sites in order to make it easy to try out a certain model
or reproduce the results in research articles without training.
For example, Model Zoo1 provides trained Caffe models for
various tasks with useful utility tools.
It has been empirically observed that utilizing trained
models to initialize the weights of a deep neural network has
potential the following benefits. Fine-tuning [42] is a strat-
egy to directly adapt such already trained models to another
application with minimum re-training time. It was reported
that pre-training neural networks often achieves lower train-
ing error than neural networks that are not pre-trained [14,
24].
Thus, sharing trained models is very important for the
rapid progress of research and development of deep neu-
ral network systems. In the future, more systematic model-
sharing platforms may appear, by analogy with video shar-
ing sites. Some digital distribution platforms for purchase
and sale of the trained models or even artificial intelligence
skills (e.g. Alexa Skills2) may appear, similar to Google Play
or App Store.
In that sense, trained models could be important assets
for the owner(s) who trained them.Dataset quality and quan-
tity directly affect the accuracy of tasks with large networks.
The success of deep neural networks has been achieved not
only by algorithms but also through massive amounts of
data and computational power. Even if the same architecture
is employed for different applications, their model weights
and their performance are not be guaranteed to be equal.
For instance, if two applications employ the same architec-
ture such as AlexNet [32], and they are trained in the same
manner but with a different dataset, the performance would
depend on the quality and quantity of the dataset. Further-
more, a large cost is incurred to create a dataset of sufficient
size for specific and realistic tasks. From the viewpoint of
applications, it could be argued that model weights rather
than architectures constitute competitive advantage.
We argue that trained models could be treated as intellec-
tual property, and we believe that providing copyright pro-
tection for trained models is a worthwhile challenge. Discus-
sion on whether or not the copyright law can protect compu-
tationally trained models is outside the scope of this paper.
We focus on how to technically protect the copyrights of
trained models.
To this end, we employ a digital watermarking idea, which
is used to identify ownership of the copyright of digital con-
tent such as images, audio, and videos. In this paper, we pro-
pose a digital watermarking technology for neural networks.
1 https://github.com/BVLC/caffe/wiki/Model-Zoo
2 https://www.amazon.com/skills/
In particular, we propose a general framework to embed a
watermark in deep neural networks models to protect in-
tellectual property and detect intellectual property infringe-
ment of trained models. This paper is an extended version
of [48] with further analysis of attacks on the watermark.
2 Problem Formulation
Given a model network with or without trained parameters,
we define the task of watermark embedding as embedding
T -bit vector b ∈ {0, 1}T into the parameters of one or more
layers of the neural network. We refer to a neural network
in which a watermark is embedded as a host network, and
refer to the task that the host network is originally trying to
perform as the original task.
In the following, we formulate (1) requirements for an
embedded watermark or an embedding method, (2) embed-
ding situations, and (3) expected types of attacks against
which embedded watermarks should be robust.
2.1 Requirements
Table 1 summarizes the requirements for an effective water-
marking algorithm in an image domain [12,21] and a neural
network domain.While both domains share almost the same
requirements, fidelity and robustness are different in image
and neural network domains. For fidelity in an image do-
main, it is essential to maintain the perceptual quality of the
host image while embedding a watermark. However, in a
neural network domain, the parameters themselves are not
important. Instead, the performance of the original task is
important. Therefore, it is essential to maintain the perfor-
mance of the trained host network, and not to hamper the
training of a host network.
Regarding robustness, as images are subject to various
signal processing operations, an embeddedwatermark should
stay in the host image even after these operations. Note that
the greatest possible modification to a neural network is fine-
tuning or transfer learning [42]. An embedded watermark in
a neural network should be detectable after fine-tuning or
other possible modifications.
2.2 Embedding Situations
We classify the embedding situations into three types: train-
to-embed, fine-tune-to-embed, and distill-to-embed, as sum-
marized in Table 2.
Train-to-embed is the case in which the host network
is trained from scratch while embedding a watermark where
labels for training data are available.
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Table 1 Requirements for an effective watermarking algorithm in the image and neural network domains.
Image domain Neural networks domain
Fidelity The quality of the host image should not be degraded
by embedding a watermark.
The effectiveness of the host network should not be de-
graded by embedding a watermark.
Robustness The embedded watermark should be robust against
common signal processing operations such as lossy
compression, cropping, resizing, and so on.
The embedded watermark should be robust against
model modifications such as fine-tuning and model
compression.
Capacity An effective watermarking system must have the ability to embed a large amount of information.
Security A watermark should in general be secret and should not be accessed, read, or modified by unauthorized parties.
Efficiency The watermark embedding and extraction processes should be fast.
Table 2 Three embedding situations. Fine-tune indicates whether pa-
rameters are initialized in embedding using already trained models, or
not. Label availability indicates whether or not labels for training data
are available in embedding.
Fine-tune Label availability
Train-to-embed X
Fine-tune-to-embed X X
Distill-to-embed X
Fine-tune-to-embed is the case in which a watermark
is embedded while fine-tuning. In this case, model parame-
ters are initialized with a pre-trained network. The network
configuration near the output layer may be changed before
fine-tuning in order to adapt the final layer’s output to an-
other task.
Distill-to-embed is the case in which a watermark is
embedded into a trained network without labels using the
distilling approach [23]. Embedding is performed in fine-
tuning where the predictions of the trained model are used
as labels. In the standard distill framework, a large network
(or multiple networks) is first trained and then a smaller net-
work is trained using the predicted labels of the large net-
work in order to compress the large network. In this paper,
we use the distill framework as a simple way to train a net-
work without labels.
The first two situations assume that the copyright holder
of the host network is expected to embed a watermark into
the host network during training or fine-tuning. Fine-tune-
to-embed is also useful when a model owner wants to embed
individual watermarks to identify those to whom the model
had been distributed. By doing so, individual instances can
be tracked. The last situation assumes that a non-copyright
holder (e.g., a platformer) is entrusted to embed a watermark
on behalf of a copyright holder.
2.3 Expected Attack Types
Related to the requirement for robustness in Section 2.1, we
assume three types of attacks against which embedded wa-
termarks should be robust: fine-tuning, model compression
and watermark overwriting.
2.3.1 Fine-tuning
Fine-tuning [42] seems to be the most feasible type of at-
tack, whether intentionally or unintentionally, because it em-
pirically has the following potential benefits as follows. To
utilize trained models as initial weights of training another
networks often achieves lower training error than training
from scratch [14, 24]. The fine-tuning step helps to reduce
both the computational cost and improve the performance.
Many models have been constructed on top of existing state-
of-the-art models. Fine-tuning alters the model parameters,
and thus embedded watermarks should be robust against this
alteration.
2.3.2 Model compression
Model compression is very important in deploying deep neu-
ral networks in embedded systems or mobile devices as it
can significantly reduce memory requirements and/or com-
putational cost. Model compression can be easily imagined
by analogy with lossy image compression in the image do-
main. Lossy compression distorts model parameters, so we
should explore how it affects the detection rate.
2.3.3 Watermark overwriting
Watermark overwriting would be a severe attack. Attackers
may try to destroy an existing watermark by embedding dif-
ferent watermark in the same manner. Ideally embedded wa-
termarks should be robust against this type of attack.
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3 Proposed Framework
In this section, we propose a framework for embedding a
watermark into a host network. Although we focus on a
DCNN [35] as the host, our framework is essentially ap-
plicable to other networks such as standard multilayer per-
ceptron (MLP), recurrent neural networks (RNN), and long
short-term memory (LSTM) [25].
3.1 Embedding Targets
In this paper, a watermark is assumed to be embedded into
one of the convolutional layers in a host DCNN3. Let (S, S),
D, and L respectively denote the size of the convolution fil-
ter, the depth of input to the convolutional layer, and the
number of filters in the convolutional layer. The parameters
of this convolutional layer are characterized by the tensor
W ∈ RS×S×D×L. The bias term is ignored here. Let us
think of embedding a T -bit vector b ∈ {0, 1}T into W .
The tensor W is a set of L convolutional filters and the or-
der of the filters does not affect the output of the network
if the parameters of the subsequent layers are appropriately
re-ordered. In order to remove this arbitrariness in the or-
der of filters, we calculate the mean of W over L filters as
W ijk =
1
L
∑
lWijkl . Letting w ∈ R
M (M = S × S ×D)
denote a flattened version ofW , our objective is now to em-
bed T -bit vector b intow.
3.2 Embedding Regularizer
It is possible to embed a watermark into a host network
by directly modifying w of a trained network, as is usually
done in the image domain. However, this approach degrades
the performance of the host network in the original task as
shown later in Section 4.3.1. Instead, we propose embedding
a watermark while training a host network for the original
task so that the existence of the watermark does not impair
the performance of the host network in its original task. To
this end, we utilize a parameter regularizer, which is an ad-
ditional term in the original cost function for the original
task. The cost function E(w) with a regularizer is defined
as:
E(w) = E0(w) + λER(w), (1)
where E0(w) is the original cost function, ER(w) is a reg-
ularization term that imposes a certain restriction on pa-
rameters w, and λ is an adjustable parameter. A regular-
izer is usually used to prevent overfitting in neural networks.
3 Fully-connected layers can also be used but we focus on convolu-
tional layers here, because fully-connected layers are often discarded
in fine-tuning.
L2 regularization (or weight decay [33]), L1 regularization,
and their combination are often used to reduce over-fitting
of parameters for complex neural networks. For instance,
ER(w) = ||w||22 in the L2 regularization.
In contrast to these standard regularizers, our regularizer
imposes a certain statistical bias on parameter w, as a wa-
termark in a training process. We refer to this regularizer as
an embedding regularizer. Before defining the embedding
regularizer, we explain how to extract a watermark fromw.
Given a (mean) parameter vector w ∈ RM and an embed-
ding parameter X ∈ RT×M , the watermark extraction is
simply done by projecting w using X , followed by thresh-
olding at 0. More precisely, the j-th bit is extracted as:
bj = s(
∑
i
Xjiwi), (2)
where s(x) is a step function:
s(x) =
{
1 x ≥ 0
0 else.
(3)
This process can be considered to be a binary classifica-
tion problem with a single-layer perceptron (without bias)4.
Therefore, it is straightforward to define the loss function
ER(w) for the embedding regularizer by using (binary) cross
entropy:
ER(w) = −
T∑
j=1
(bj log(yj) + (1− bj) log(1− yj)) , (4)
where yj = σ(
∑
iXjiwi) and σ(·) is the sigmoid function:
σ(x) =
1
1 + exp(−x)
. (5)
We call this loss function an embedding loss function.
Note that an embedding loss function is used to update
w, not X , in our framework. It may be confusing that w is
an input and X is a parameter to be learned in a standard
perceptron. In our case, w is an embedding target and X
is a fixed parameter.X works as a secret key [21] to detect
an embedded watermark. The design of X is discussed in
Section 3.3.
This approach does not impair the performance of the
host network in the original task as confirmed in experi-
ments, because deep neural networks are typically
over-parameterized. It is well-known that deep neural net-
works have many local minima, and that all local minima are
likely to have an error very close to that of the global min-
imum [10, 13]. Therefore, the embedding regularizer only
needs to guidemodel parameters to one of a number of good
local minima so that the final model parameters have an ar-
bitrary watermark.
4 Although this single-layer perceptron can be deepened into multi-
layer perceptron, we focus on the simplest one in this paper.
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3.3 Regularizer Parameters
In this section we discuss the design of the embedding pa-
rameter X , which can be considered as a secret key [21] in
detecting and embedding watermarks. While X ∈ RT×M
can be an arbitrary matrix, it will affect the performance of
an embedded watermark because it is used in both embed-
ding and extraction of watermarks. In this paper, we con-
sider three types ofX:Xdirect,Xdiff, andX random.
X
direct is constructed so that one element in each row
of Xdirect is ’1’ and the others are ’0’. In this case, the j-
th bit bj is directly embedded in a certain parameter wiˆ s.t.
X
direct
jiˆ
= 1.
X
diff is created so that each row has one ’1’ element and
one ’-1’ element, and the others are ’0’. UsingXdiff, the j-th
bit bj is embedded into the difference between wi+ and wi−
whereXdiffji+ = 1 andX
diff
ji
−
= −1.
Each element of X random is independently drawn from
the standard normal distribution N (0, 1). Using X random,
each bit is embedded into all instances of the parameter w
with random weights. These three types of embedding pa-
rameters are compared in experiments.
4 Experiments
In this section, we demonstrate that our embedding regular-
izer can embed a watermark without impairing the perfor-
mance of the host network, and the embedded watermark is
robust against various types of attacks. Our implementation
of the embedding regularizer is publicly available 5.
4.1 Evaluation Settings
4.1.1 Dataset
For experiments, we used the well-known CIFAR-10 and
Caltech-101 datasets. The CIFAR-10 dataset [31] consists
of 60,000 32 × 32 color images in 10 classes, with 6,000
images per class. These images were separated into 50,000
training images and 10,000 test images. The Caltech-101
dataset [16] includes pictures of objects belonging to 101
categories; it contains about 40 to 800 images per category.
The size of each image is roughly 300 × 200 pixels but we
resized them to 32× 32 for fine-tuning. For testing, we used
30 images for training and at most 40 of the remaining im-
ages for each category.
4.1.2 Host Network and Training Settings
We used the wide residual network [52] as the host network.
The wide residual network is an efficient variant of the resid-
5 https://github.com/yu4u/dnn-watermark
Table 3 Structure of the host network. N is the number of blocks and
k is a widening factor in groups.
Group Output size Building block M
ResNe block type = B(3, 3)
conv 1 32 × 32 [3× 3, 16] N/A
conv 2 32 × 32

3× 3, 16× k
3× 3, 16× k

×N 144 × k
conv 3 16 × 16

3× 3, 32× k
3× 3, 32× k

×N 288 × k
conv 4 8× 8

3× 3, 64× k
3× 3, 64× k

×N 576 × k
1× 1 avg-pool, fc, soft-max N/A
ual network [22]. Table 3 shows the structure of the wide
residual network. A depth parameter N is the number of
blocks in groups, and a width parameter k is widening fac-
tor that scales the width of the residual blocks in groups.
In all our experiments, we set N = 1 and k = 4, and
used SGD with Nesterov momentum [1, 39, 43] and cross-
entropy loss in training. The initial learning rate was set at
0.1, weight decay to 5.0×10−4, momentum to 0.9 and mini-
batch size to 64. The learning rate was dropped by a factor
of 0.2 at 60, 120 and 160 epochs, and we trained for a total
of 200 epochs, following the settings used in [52].
We embedded a watermark into one of the following
convolution layers: the second convolutional layer in the
conv 2, conv 3, and conv 4 groups. Hereinafter, we refer to
the location of the host layer by simply describing the conv
2, conv 3, or conv 4 group. In Table 3, the number M of
parameter w is also shown for these layers. The parameter
λ in Eq. (1) is set to 0.01. As a watermark, we embedded
b = 1 ∈ {0, 1}T in the following experiments.
4.2 Embedding Results
We trained the host network from scratch (train-to-embed)
on the CIFAR-10 dataset with and without embedding a wa-
termark. In the embedding case, a 256-bit watermark (T =
256) was embedded into the conv 2 group.
4.2.1 Detecting Watermarks
Figure 1 shows the histogram of the embedded watermark
σ(
∑
iXjiwi) (before thresholding) with and without wa-
termarks where (a) direct, (b) diff, and (c) random param-
eters are used in embedding and detection. If we binarize
σ(
∑
iXjiwi) at a threshold of 0.5, all watermarks are cor-
rectly detected because ∀j, σ(
∑
iXjiwi) ≥ 0.5 if and only
if
∑
iXjiwi ≥ 0 for all embedded cases. Please note that we
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embedded b = 1 ∈ {0, 1}T as a watermark as previously
mentioned. Although random watermarks will be detected
for the non-embedded cases, it can be easily determined if
that the watermark is not embedded because the distribution
of σ(
∑
iXjiwi) is quite different from those for embedded
cases.
4.2.2 Distribution of Model Parameters
We explore how trained model parameters are affected by
the embedded watermarks. Figure 2 shows the distribution
of model parameters W (not w) with and without water-
marks. These parameters are taken only from the layer in
which a watermark was embedded. Note that W is the pa-
rameter before taking the mean over filters, and thus the
number of parameters is 3 × 3 × 64 × 64. We can see that
direct and diff significantly alter the distribution of param-
eters while random does not. In direct, many parameters
became large and a peak appears near 2 so that their mean
over filters becomes a large positive value to reduce the em-
bedding loss. In diff, most parameters were pushed in both
positive and negative directions so that the differences be-
tween these parameters became large. In random, a water-
mark is diffused over all parameters with random weights
and thus does not significantly alter the distribution. This is
one of the desirable properties of watermarking related to
the security requirement; one may be aware of the existence
of the embedded watermarks for the direct and diff cases.
The results so far indicated that the random approach
seemed to be the best choice among the three, with low em-
bedding loss, low test error in the original task, and no alter-
ation of the parameter distribution. Therefore, in the follow-
ing experiments, we used the random approach in embed-
ding watermarks without explicitly indicating it.
4.3 Fidelity
4.3.1 Embedding without Training
As mentioned in Section 3.2, it is possible to embed a wa-
termark in a host network by directly modifying the trained
parameter w0 as usually done in the image domain. Here
we try to do this by minimizing the following loss function
instead of Eq. (1):
E(w) = 1
2
||w −w0||
2
2
+ λER(w), (6)
where the embedding loss ER(w) is minimized while min-
imizing the difference between the modified parameter w
and the original parameterw0. Table 4 summarizes the em-
bedding results after minimizing Eq. (6) against the host net-
work trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset. We can see that em-
bedding fails for λ ≤ 1 as the bit error rate (BER) is larger
Table 4 Losses, test error (%), and bit error rate (BER) after embed-
ding a watermark with different λ.
λ 1
2
||w−w0||22 ER(w) Test error BER
0 0.000 1.066 8.04 0.531
1 0.184 0.609 8.52 0.324
10 1.652 0.171 10.57 0.000
100 7.989 0.029 13.00 0.000
Table 5 Test error (%) and embedding loss ER(w) with and without
embedding.
Test error ER(w)
Not embedded 8.04 N/A
direct 8.21 1.24×10−1
diff 8.37 6.20×10−2
random 7.97 4.76×10−4
than zero while the test error of the original task becomes
too large for λ > 1. Thus, it is not effective to directly em-
bed a watermark without considering the original task.
4.3.2 Test Error and Training Loss
Figure 3 shows the training curves for the host network in
CIFAR-10 as a function of epochs. Not embedded is the
case where the host network is trained without the embed-
ding regularizer.Embedded (direct),Embedded (diff), and
Embedded (random) respectively represent training curves
with embedding regularizers whose parameters are Xdirect,
X
diff, and X random . We can see that the training loss E(w)
with a watermark becomes larger than the not-embedded
case if the parametersXdirect and Xdiff are used. This large
training loss is dominated by the embedding loss ER(w),
which indicates that it is difficult to embed a watermark di-
rectly into a parameter or even into the difference of two
parameters. On the other hand, the training loss of Embed-
ded (random) is very close to that of Not embedded.
Table 5 shows the best test errors and embedding losses
ER(w) of the host networks with and without embedding.
We can see that the test errors of Not embedded and ran-
dom are almost the same while those of direct and diff are
slightly larger. The embedding loss ER(w) of random is
extremely low compared with those of direct and diff. These
results indicate that the random approach can effectively
embed a watermark without impairing the performance in
the original task.
4.3.3 Fine-tune-to-embed and Distill-to-embed
In the above experiments, a watermark was embedded by
training the host network from scratch (train-to-embed).Here,
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Fig. 1 Histogram of the embedded watermark σ(
∑
i
Xjiwi) (before thresholding) with and without watermarks. All watermarks will be success-
fully detected by binarizing σ(
∑
i
Xjiwi) at a threshold of 0.5. In the case of random, it can be easily determined whether or not a watermark is
embedded with the histogram.
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Fig. 2 Distribution of model parameters W with and without watermarks.
we evaluated the other two situations introduced in Section 2.2:
fine-tune-to-embed and distill-to-embed.
For fine-tune-to-embed, two experimentswere performed.
In the first experiment, the host network was trained on the
CIFAR-10 dataset without embedding, and then fine-tuned
on the same CIFAR-10 dataset with and without embedding
(for comparison). In the second experiment, the host net-
work is trained on the Caltech-101 dataset, and then fine-
tuned on the CIFAR-10 dataset with and without embed-
ding.
Table 6 (a) shows the result of the first experiment. Not
embedded 1st corresponds to the first training without em-
bedding. Not embedded 2nd corresponds to the second
training without embedding and Embedded corresponds
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Fig. 3 Training curves for the host network on CIFAR-10 as a function
of epochs. Solid lines denote test error (y-axis on the left) and dashed
lines denote training loss E(w) (y-axis on the right).
to the second training with embedding. Figure 4 shows the
training curves of these fine-tunings6. We can see that Em-
bedded achieved almost the same test error as Not embed-
ded 2nd and a very low ER(w).
Table 6 (b) shows the results of the second experiment.
Not embedded 2nd corresponds to the second trainingwith-
out embedding and Embedded corresponds to the second
training with embedding. Figure 5 shows the training curves
of these fine-tunings. The test error and training loss of the
first training are not shown because they are not compati-
ble with the two different training datasets. From these re-
sults, it was also confirmed thatEmbedded achieved almost
the same test error as Not embedded 2nd and very low
ER(w). Thus, we can say that the proposed method is ef-
fective even in the fine-tune-to-embed situation (in the same
and different domains).
Finally, embedding a watermark in the distill-to-embed
situation was evaluated. The host network is first trained on
the CIFAR-10 dataset without embedding. Then, the trained
networkwas further fine-tuned on the same CIFAR-10 dataset
with and without embedding. In this second training, the
training labels of the CIFAR-10 dataset were not used. In-
stead, the predicted values of the trained network were used
as soft targets [23]. In other words, no label was used in the
second training. Table 6 (c) shows the results for the distill-
to-embed situation. Not embedded 1st corresponds to the
first training and Embedded (Not embedded 2nd) cor-
responds to the second distilling training with embedding
(without embedding). It was found that the proposedmethod
also achieved low test error and ER(w) in the distill-to-
embed situation. Table 6 (d) shows the result for the distill-
6 Note that the learning rate was also initialized to 0.1 at the be-
ginning of the second training, while the learning rate was reduced to
8.0× 10−4) at the end of the first training.
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Fig. 4 Training curves for fine-tuning the host network. The first and
second halves of epochs correspond to the first and second training.
Solid lines denote test error (y-axis on the left) and dashed lines denote
training loss (y-axis on the right).
Table 6 Test error (%) and embedding loss ER(w) with and without
embedding in fine-tuning and distilling.
(a) Fine-tune-to-embed (CIFAR-10→ CIFAR-10)
Test error ER(w)
Not embedded 1st 8.04 N/A
Not embedded 2nd 7.66 N/A
Embedded 7.70 4.93×10−4
(b) Fine-tune-to-embed (Caltech-101→ CIFAR-10)
Test error ER(w)
Not embedded 2nd 7.93 N/A
Embedded 7.94 4.83×10−4
(c) Distill-to-embed (CIFAR-10→ CIFAR-10)
Test error ER(w)
Not embedded 1st 8.04 N/A
Not embedded 2nd 7.86 N/A
Embedded 7.75 5.01×10−4
(d) Distill-to-embed (CIFAR-10→ Caltech-101)
Test error ER(w)
Not embedded 1st 8.04 N/A
Embedded 28.34 5.80×10−3
to-embed situation on the different domain; the difference
from Table 6 (c) is that the predicted values for the Caltech-
101 are used as soft targets here instead of CIFAR-10. The
test error is calculated on CIFAR-10.
4.4 Robustness of Embedded Watermarks
In this section, the robustness of the proposed watermark
is evaluated for the three types of attacks explained in Sec-
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Fig. 5 Training curves for the host network on CIFAR-10 as a function
of epochs. Solid lines denote test error (y-axis on the left) and dashed
lines denote training loss (y-axis on the right).
tion 2.3: fine-tuning,model compression, and watermark over-
writing.
4.4.1 Robustness against Fine-tuning
Fine-tuning or transfer learning [42] seems to be the most
likely type of (unintentional) attack because it is frequently
performed on trainedmodels to apply them to other but simi-
lar tasks with less effort than training a network from scratch
or to avoid over-fitting when sufficient training data are not
available.
In this experiment, two trainings were performed; in the
first training, a 256-bit watermarkwas embedded in the conv
2 group in the train-to-embedmanner, and then the host net-
work was further fine-tuned in the second training without
embedding, to determine whether or not the watermark em-
bedded in the first training stayed in the host network, even
after the second training (fine-tuning).
Table 7 shows the embedding loss before fine-tuning
(ER(w)) and after fine-tuning (E
′
R(w)), and the best test
error after fine-tuning. In the same domain, the host net-
work is trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset while embedding
a watermark, and then further fine-tuned without embed-
ding a watermark. We evaluated fine-tuning in the same do-
main (CIFAR-10→ CIFAR-10) and in the different domains
(Caltech-101→ CIFAR-10). We can see that, in both cases,
the embedding loss was increased slightly by fine-tuning but
was still low. In addition, the bit error rate of the detected
watermark was equal to zero in both cases. The reason why
the embedding loss in fine-tuning in the different domains
is higher than that in the same domain is that the Caltech-
101 dataset is significantly more difficult than the CIFAR-10
dataset in our settings; all images in the Caltech-101 dataset
Table 7 Embedding loss before fine-tuning (ER(w)) and after fine-
tuning (E′
R
(w)), and the best test error (%) and bit error rate (BER)
after fine-tuning.
ER(w) E′R(w) BERTest error
CIFAR-10→ CIFAR-10 4.76×10−48.66×10−4 0.00 7.69
Caltech-101→ CIFAR-10 5.96×10−31.56×10−2 0.00 7.88
were resized to 32× 327 for compatibility with the CIFAR-
10 dataset.
4.4.2 Robustness against Model Compression
It is sometimes difficult to deploy deep neural networks in
embedded systems or mobile devices because they are both
computationally intensive and memory intensive. In order
to solve this problem, the model parameters are often com-
pressed [18–20]. The compression of model parameters can
intentionally or unintentionally act as an attack against wa-
termarks. In this section, we evaluate the robustness of our
watermarks againstmodel compression, in particular, against
parameter pruning [20] and distillation [23].
Robustness against parameter pruning. In parameter
pruning, parameters whose absolute values are very small
are cut-off to zero. In [19], quantization of weights and the
Huffman coding of quantized values are further applied. Be-
cause quantization has less impact than parameter pruning
and the Huffman coding is lossless compression, we focus
on parameter pruning.
In order to evaluate robustness against parameter prun-
ing, we embedded a 256-bit watermark in the conv 2 group
while training the host network on the CIFAR-10 dataset.
We removed α% of the 3 × 3 × 64 × 64 parameters of the
embedded layer and calculated embedding loss and bit error
rate. Figure 6 (a) shows embedding loss ER(w) as a func-
tion of pruning rateα.Ascending (Descending) represents
embedding loss when the top α% parameters are cut-off ac-
cording to their absolute values in ascending (descending)
order.Random represents embedding loss where α% of pa-
rameters are randomly removed.Ascending corresponds to
parameter pruning and the others were evaluated for com-
parison. We can see that the embedding loss of Ascending
increases more slowly than those of Descending and Ran-
dom as α increases. It is reasonable that model parameters
with small absolute values have less impact on a detected
watermark because the watermark is extracted from the dot
product of the model parameter w and the constant embed-
ding parameter (weight)X .
Figure 6 (b) shows the bit error rate as a function of prun-
ing rate α. Surprisingly, the bit error rate was still zero after
7 This size is extremely small compared with their original sizes
(roughly 300 × 200).
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Fig. 6 Embedding loss and bit error rate after pruning as a function of
pruning rate.
removing 65% of the parameters and 2/256 even after 80%
of the parameters were pruned (Ascending). We can say
that the embedded watermark is sufficiently robust against
parameter pruning because, in [19], the resulting pruning
rate of convolutional layers ranged from to 16% to 65% for
the AlexNet [32], and from 42% to 78% for VGGNet [42].
Furthermore, this degree of bit error can be easily corrected
by an error correction code (e.g. the BCH code). Figure 7
shows the histogram of the detected watermark σ(
∑
iXjiwi)
after pruning for α = 0.8 and 0.95. For α = 0.95, the his-
togram of the detected watermark is also shown for the host
network into which no watermark is embedded. We can see
that many of σ(
∑
iXjiwi) are still close to one for the em-
bedded case, which might be used as a confidence score in
determining the existence of a watermark (zero-bit water-
marking).
Robustness against distillation. Distillation is a train-
ing procedure initially designed to train a deep neural net-
works model using knowledge transferred from a different
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Fig. 7 Histogram of the detected watermark σ(
∑
i
Xjiwi) after prun-
ing.
Table 8 Test error (%), and bit error rate (BER) of the embedded host
network and after distilling without embedding the watermark.
Test error BER
Embedded 1st 8.05 0.00
After distillation 8.40 0.54
model. The intuition was suggested in [3] while distilla-
tion itself was formally introduced in [23]. Distillation is
employed to reduce computational complexity or compress-
ing the knowledge in an ensemble of models into a single
small model. In the standard distillation framework, a large
network (or multiple networks) is first trained and then a
smaller network is trained using the predicted labels of the
large network in order to compress the large network. As
well as fine-tuning, distillation could be an unintentional at-
tack and it is specific to deep neural networks.
In this experiment, we performed two trainings. First a
256-bit watermark was embedded in the conv 2 group in the
train-to-embedmanner with CIFAR-10. Then, in the second
training, another model was distilled using the CIFAR-10
dataset and the predicted values of the first trained network
instead of the actual labels. The second training did not em-
bed a watermark and initial weights were set at random. We
employed the simplest form of distillation in this experi-
ment. Although we could use a different network architec-
ture and different dataset in the transfer step, we trained a
new model of the same architecture on the same set CIFAR-
10 for simplicity.
Table 8 shows the test error and bit error rate after the
first and second training. The watermark could not be de-
tected from the distilled model as expected because the model
weights had been initialized with random weights.
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4.4.3 Robustness against Watermark Overwriting
Overwriting is a common attack in digital content water-
marking [27]. A third-party user may embed a different wa-
termark in order to overwrite the original watermark. Basi-
cally, it is necessary to know where the original watermark
is embedded to overwrite watermarks. Please note that in
addition to regularizer parameters X , which work as a se-
cret key, the location where a digital watermark is embedded
should be also be secret information. However, it is conceiv-
able for a watermark to be embedded into all or multiple lay-
ers to destroy the embedded original watermark or change
ownership without exact information on where the original
watermark is actually embedded.
In order to evaluate robustness against overwriting, we
embedded a 256-bit watermark in the conv 2, conv 3 and
conv 4 groups with a regularizer parameterX0, while train-
ing the host network on the CIFAR-10 dataset. Then, we ad-
ditionally embedded a 256-bit, 512-bit, 1024-bit and 2048-
bit watermark into the host network respectively with a reg-
ularizer parameter X0 different from X1. The number of
parameters w of conv 2, conv 3, and conv 4 groups were
576, 1152, and 2304, respectively. All bit error rates of the
original host networks were zero. The additional watermarks
were embedded while training on the CIFAR-10 dataset.
Table 9 shows test error, embedding loss ER(w) and
bit error rate with the first regularizer parameter X0 after
overwriting the first watermark. When the bit error rate is
close to 0.5, it indicates that the original watermark has been
erased completely. We can see that the original watermark
was erased in some cases where the number of embedded
bits was large compared to the number of parametersw.
4.5 Capacity of Watermark.
In this section, the capacity of the embedded watermark is
explored by embedding different sizes of watermarks into
different groups in the train-to-embed manner. Please note
that the number of parameters w of conv 2, conv 3, and
conv 4 groups were 576, 1152, and 2304, respectively. Ta-
ble 10 shows test error (%), embedding loss ER(w) and bit
error rate for combinations of different embedded blocks
and different numbers of embedded bits. We can see that
embedded loss or test error becomes high if the number of
embedded bits becomes larger than the number of parame-
ters w (e.g. 2,048 bits in conv 3) because the embedding
problem becomes overdetermined in such cases. Thus, the
number of embedded bits should be smaller than the num-
ber of parameters w, which is a limitation of the embed-
ding method using a single-layer perceptron. This limitation
would be resolved by using a multi-layer perceptron in the
embedding regularizer.
Table 9 Test error (%), embedding loss ER(w) and bit error rate with
the original regularizer parameter after overwriting a watermark. The
number of parameters w of conv 2, conv 3, and conv 4 groups are
576, 1152, and 2304, respectively.
(a) Test error (%)
Embedded bits Embedded group
conv 2 conv 3 conv 4
256 7.43 7.36 7.96
512 7.29 7.35 7.92
1,024 7.58 7.41 7.96
2,048 7.36 7.61 7.94
(b) Embedding loss
Embedded bits Embedded group
conv 2 conv 3 conv 4
256 1.67 2.05×10−1 4.98×10−2
512 4.28 1.13 1.94×10−1
1,024 1.77×101 3.76 5.24×10−1
2,048 1.04 1.12×101 1.40
(c) Bit error rate
Embedded bits Embedded group
conv 2 conv 3 conv 4
256 3.09×10−1 8.59×10−2 3.90×10−3
512 4.10×10−1 2.38×10−1 6.64×10−2
1,024 5.11×10−1 4.29×10−1 1.99×10−1
2,048 5.27×10−1 5.07×10−1 3.55×10−1
5 Discussion
5.1 Insights
Fidelity. As mentioned in Section 3.2, poor local min-
ima are rarely a problemwith large networks in practice. Re-
gardless of the initial conditions, the system nearly always
reaches solutions of very similar quality. Recent theoretical
and empirical results strongly suggest that local minima are
not a serious issue in general [34]. Therefore, the proposed
approach was able to maintain the performance of the origi-
nal task and carry out successful watermarking as shown in
the experimental results of Section 4.3.2 and Section 4.3.3.
Robustness. For watermarking techniques in the neural
networks domain, fine-tuning seems to be the most feasi-
ble and significant attack. The experimental results in Sec-
tion 4.4.1 show the proposed method could retain the wa-
termark completely after fine-tuning in both cases: the same
domain and a different domain. In the case of the same do-
main, updates of weight values were assumed to be small
if the host model was trained well in the first training. On
the other hand, in the case of a different domain, weight val-
ues are supposed to change dramatically. However, our ex-
perimental results show the watermark remained after fine-
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Table 10 Test error (%), embedding loss ER(w) and bit error rate for
the combinations of embedded groups and sizes of embedded bits. The
number of parameters w of conv 2, conv 3, and conv 4 groups were
576, 1152, and 2304, respectively.
(a) Test error (%)
Embedded bits Embedded group
conv 2 conv 3 conv 4
256 7.97 7.98 7.92
512 8.47 8.22 7.84
1,024 8.43 8.12 7.84
2,048 8.17 8.93 7.75
(b) Embedding loss
Embedded bits Embedded group
conv 2 conv 3 conv 4
256 4.76×10−4 7.20×10−4 1.10×10−2
512 8.11×10−4 8.18×10−4 1.25×10−2
1,024 6.74×10−2 1.53×10−3 1.53×10−2
2,048 5.35×10−1 3.70×10−2 3.06×10−2
(c) Bit error rate
Embedded bits Embedded group
conv 2 conv 3 conv 4
256 0.00 0.00 0.00
512 0.00 0.00 0.00
1,024 0.00 0.00 0.00
2,048 0.28 0.00 0.00
tuning to a different domain. It is considered that fine-tuning
would cause less alteration for weights near the input layer
compared to near the output layer. Therefore, the digital
watermark could successfully resist a fine-tuning attack, if
the watermark is embedded near the input layer of suffi-
ciently deep networks. Additionally, there is an advantage
that the network configuration near the input layer may not
be changed for another task.
Capacity. The result presented in Section 4.5 indicates
that the capacity is strongly related to the number of the
host weights compared to the length of watermarks. Capac-
ity may be increased by using a multi-layer perceptron in the
embedding regularizer.
5.2 Limitations
Although we have obtained some initial insight into the new
problemof embedding a watermark in deep neural networks,
the proposed approach still has the following limitations.
Distillation. Distillation is theoretically a serious attack
for watermarking of neural networks. However, distillation
does not seem to be an important attack in reality, since it
requires data that are very similar to the inputs used in the
original training phase in order to maintain fidelity.
Overwriting. As shown in Section 4.4.3, overwriting
destroys the original watermark. This experiment is assumed
to know exactly where the original watermark was embed-
ded. It is conceivable that watermarks could be embedded
into all or multiple layers to destroy the original watermark,
although this would incur a much greater computational cost
due to the large size of widely targeted parameters. Over-
writing is still a serve attack and we should explore an ef-
fective way of combatting overwriting.
Black-box type situation. In the proposed digital wa-
termarking approach for deep neural network models, we
make an assumption that the weight values are visible. Thus,
it is impossible to detect abuse in a black-box type situation
such as a client-server system where a watermarked model
is used on a server by unauthorized parties. To effectively
deal with such a situation, the copyright protection of neural
network models requires another approach. Inspired by our
work [48], Merrer et al. propose a method that allows the
extraction of the watermark from a neural network remotely
through a service API [38]. The method embeds zero-bit wa-
termarks into models with a stitching algorithm based on
adversaries.
5.3 Further Expected Developments
Further developments are expected by using the analogy of
digital content protection and domain-specific issues for deep
neural networks.
Embedding as sequential learning. In Section 4.3.1,
we have shown that it is not effective to directly embed a
watermark without considering the original task. We can
consider this embedding process as sequential learning; the
training of the original task is the first task, and subsequent
watermark embedding is the second task. Thus, the increase
of error rate after embedding can be interpreted as catas-
trophic forgetting [15]. From this point of view, we can adopt
recently developed methods [15,36] to overcome this catas-
trophic forgetting in embedding watermark.
Compression as embedding. Compressing deep neu-
ral networks is a very important and active research topic.
While we confirmed in this paper that our watermark is very
robust against parameter pruning in this paper, a watermark
might be embedded in conjunction with compressing mod-
els. For example, in [19], after parameter pruning, the net-
work is re-trained to learn the final weights for the remaining
sparse parameters. Our embedding regularizer can be used
in this re-training to embed a watermark.
Network morphism. In [8, 51], a systematic study has
been conducted on how to morph a well-trained neural net-
work into a new one so that its network function can be
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completely preserved for further training. This networkmor-
phism can constitute a severe attack against our watermark
because it may be impossible to detect the embedded wa-
termark if the topology of the host network undergoesmajor
modification.We have left the investigation into how the em-
bedded watermark is affected by this network morphism as
a topic for future work.
Steganalysis. Steganalysis [30, 41] is a method for de-
tecting the presence of secretly hidden data (e.g. steganog-
raphy or watermarks) in digital media files such as images,
video, audio, and, in our case, deep neural networks. Water-
marks ideally are robust against steganalysis. While, in this
paper, we confirmed that embedding watermarks does not
significantly change the distribution of model parameters,
more exploration is needed to evaluate robustness against
steganalysis. Conversely, developing effective steganalysis
against watermarks for deep neural networks could be an
interesting research topic.
Fingerprinting. Digital fingerprinting is an alternative
to the watermarking approach for persistent identification
of images [5], video [28, 47], and audio clips [2, 17]. In
this paper, we focused on one of these two important ap-
proaches. Robust fingerprinting of deep neural networks is
another and complementary direction to protect deep neural
network models.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a general framework for
embedding a watermark in deep neural network models to
protect the rights to the trained models. First, we formu-
lated a new problem: embedding watermarks into deep neu-
ral networks.We also defined requirements, embedding situ-
ations, and the types of attacks that watermarking deep neu-
ral networks are vulnerable to. Second, we proposed a gen-
eral framework for embedding a watermark in model param-
eters using a parameter regularizer. Our approach does not
impair the performance of networks into which a watermark
is embedded. Finally, we performed comprehensive exper-
iments to reveal the potential of watermarking deep neural
networks as the basis of this new problem. We showed that
our framework could embed a watermark without impairing
the performance of a deep neural network. The embedded
watermark did not disappear even after fine-tuning or pa-
rameter pruning; the entire watermark remained even after
65% of the parameters were pruned.
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